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UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Wyo. Sawmills v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 148 (Fed. Cl. 2009).
LAW: The National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.
§ 472a (NFMA) "sets forth the terms and conditions under which the
Forest Service may contract to harvest timber from federal forest
resources." Section 472a(c) of the NFMA holds:
The length and other terms of the contract shall be
designed to promote orderly harvesting consistent
with the principles set out in section 6 of the Forest
and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of
1974, as amended [16 U.S.C.A. § 1604]. Unless there
is a finding by the Secretary of Agriculture that better
utilization of the various forest resources (consistent
with the provisions of the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960 [16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-531]) will
result, sales contracts shall be for a period not to
exceed ten years: Provided, [t]hat such period may be
adjusted at the discretion of the Secretary to provide
additional time due to time delays caused by an act of
an agent of the United States or by other
circumstances beyond the control of the purchaser.
The Secretary shall require the purchaser to file as
soon as practicable after execution of a contract for
any advertised sale with a term of two years or more, a
plan of operation, which shall be subject to
concurrence by the Secretary. The Secretary shall not
extend any contract period with an original term of
two years or more unless he finds (A) that the
purchaser has diligently performed in accordance with
an approved plan of operation or (B) that the
substantial overriding public interest justifies the
extension.
FACTS: Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. (Plaintiff) operates a lumber
mill in Sheridan, Wyoming, where it produces studs to be used in
new home construction. On December 10, 1993, Plaintiff entered
into a contract with the Forest Service, "Wabash Timber Sale
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Contract No. 003876 (Contract)," which allowed Plaintiff to harvest
certain timber within the Black Hills National Forest in South
Dakota. The Contract listed a termination date of September 30,
1999, and also had a periodic payment schedule which "required
Plaintiff to pay the Forest Service one-third of the value of the
Contract by September 4, 1997, with a second and final payment of
two-thirds of the value of the Contract due on September 4, 1998."
Although Plaintiff did harvest some timber and made the first
payment, "Plaintiff has not harvested a sufficient amount of timber to
make the second and final payment."
However, the Contract has been modified on six separate
occasions. First, on January 23, 1996, a Contract Term Adjustment
(CTA) extended the Contract termination date from September 30,
1999, to August 31, 2000, thereby, "authorizing Plaintiff to harvest
timber in the Bighorn National Forest, instead of the Black Hills
National Forest, because of an urgent need of the Forest Service."
Second, "on September 16, 1996, the Contract termination date of
August 31, 2000 was extended to August 31, 2001, by special
authorization of the Chief of the Forest Service." The Chief of the
Forest Service personally "authorized this one-year extension and
deferral of the periodic payment on 'certain timber sale contracts that
were awarded prior to January 1, 1995,' because the Contract had not
been previously extended by a Market-Related Contract Term
Adjustment (MRCTA)." Third, the Contract termination date of
August 31, 2001 was extended to February 28, 2003, on December
23, 1996, "by a CTA again to authorize Plaintiff to harvest timber in
the Bighorn National Forest, because of an urgent need of the Forest
Service." Fourth, the Contract's MRCTA provision was modified on
June 25, 1998. Several provisions were modified, but one such
modification stated in pertinent part that the "[t]he revised contract
term may not exceed ten years as a result of market-related contract
term addition." Fifth, the Contract termination date of February 28,
2003, was extended to December 10, 2003, by a January 6, 1999,
MRCTA. This extension was "'due to a drastic reduction in wood
product prices in accordance with 36 C.F.R. [§] 223.52."' Sixth,
"[o]n October 26, 2001, the Contract termination date of December
10, 2003 was extended to December 20, 2008, by a third CTA, to
provide Plaintiff time to harvest timber in urgent need of removal in a
different area of the Black Hills National Forest."
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Additionally, "[o]n March 5, 2007, Plaintiff requested another
two-year MRCTA extension, from December 20, 2008, because of
the Forest Service's 'finding of substantial overriding public
interest."' At the time of Plaintiff s request, the Contract had already
been in existence for almost fifteen years. However, on March 12,
2007, "the Forest Service denied Plaintiffs MRCTA extension,
because the Contract provided that: '[t]he revised contract term may
not exceed 10 years as a result of [a] market-related contract term
addition."' The Forest Service had discovered that "'[t]he [Contract]
does not qualify for [another] MRCTA under C8.212-Market-Related
Contract Term Addition ... as the contract term exceeds ten years.'
Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a reconsideration of this decision
on March 30, 2007. However, Plaintiffs request was denied on April
2, 2007, after the Forest Service determined that the Contract no
longer qualified for an MRCTA because the contract term exceeded
ten years. On August 9, 2007, Plaintiff then wrote a letter to the
Regional Forester of Region 2, requesting a "'finding of substantial
overriding public interest[,]"' as the Contract only provided that the
term "'may be adjusted when a drastic reduction in wood product
prices has occurred in accordance with 36 C.F.R. 223.52."' This
2007 adjustment would then "extend the termination date of the
Contract from December 20, 2008, to March 20, 2011, and defer
Plaintiffs obligation to make the payment of $1,066,200 due on
November 14, 2007 until November 14, 2010." Last, on September
11, 2007, the Regional Forester of Region 2 "denied Plaintiffs
August 9, 2007 request for another adjustment, because: 'by the time
the sale terminates in December 2008, the contract will have run for
approximately fifteen years, which is clearly beyond any regulatory
allowances foreseen in the Code of Federal Regulations that regulate
timber sale contracts."'
On December 20, 2008, the Government officially terminated the
Contract, as Plaintiff failed to make the periodic payment of
$1,066,200 due November 14, 2007. Next, "[o]n April 24, 2009,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment And Memorandum In
Support, together with Proposed Findings Of Uncontroverted Fact."
Then, "[o]n June 2, 2009, the Government filed a Cross Motion For
Summary Judgment And Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For
Summary Judgment, together with a Response To Plaintiffs
Proposed Findings Of Uncontroverted Fact, and Proposed Findings
Of Uncontroverted Fact."
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ANALYSIS: The United States Court of Federal Claims'
jurisdiction "is established by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §
149 1(a)(1)." The Tucker Act allows the court
'to render judgment upon any claim against the United
States founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract
with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.'
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006). A "plaintiff must identify and plead
an independent contractual relationship, constitutional provision,
federal statute, or executive regulation that provides a substantive
right to money damages." Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167,
1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Act "authorizes the United States Court
of Federal Claims 'to render judgment upon any claim by or against,
or dispute with, a contract or arising under ... the Contract Disputes
Act of 1978, including a dispute concerning termination of a
contract."' 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2).
The Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on April 24, 2009,
contending that "the Forest Service's decision that the Wabash
Timber Sale does not qualify for a MRCTA is a breach of contract
provision C8.212# and contrary to 36 C.F.R. § 223.42. On the other
hand, "[t]he Government insists entitlement to summary judgment,
because the Contract did not qualify for a MRCTA, as it was more
than ten years old when Plaintiff requested an extension." In
Plaintiffs Response, dated June 30, 2009, Plaintiff contends "that the
plain language of the Contract, 36 C.F.R. § 223.52, and the NFMA
do not support the Government's 'narrow interpretation' that the
Contract is not entitled to MRCTA." In the Government's August
14, 2009 reply, the Government contends "that contract provision
C8.212#, by its plain and ordinary meaning, prohibits Plaintiff from
receiving an extension, if the Contract is more than ten years old."
In the instant case, the Government did "not contest that the
Contract could be extended, if the Secretary of Agriculture
determined a 'better utilization of ... forest resources will result and
if there was a finding of substantial overriding public interest."'
Further, Plaintiff did not petition "the Secretary of Agriculture to
obtain a MRCTA extension, although the National Forest
30-1
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Management Act authorizes the Secretary to extend a contract at
his/her 'discretion."' 16 U.S.C. § 472a(c). As a result, "[b]efore the
parties' dispute is ripe for adjudication, Plaintiff is required to
petition the Secretary to determine whether at this time 'better
utilization of the various forest resources . .. will result,' and whether
'the substantial overriding public interest justifies the extension."'
HOLDING: In sum, "the [C]ourt has decided to defer ruling on
Plaintiffs April 24, 2009 Motion For Summary Judgment and the
Government's June 2, 2009 Cross Motion For Summary Judgment."
The Court chose to stay the case for six months, in order "to afford
the Plaintiff the opportunity to petition the Secretary of Agriculture
and for the Secretary to decide whether, and how long, to grant any
extension of the Contract." 16 U.S.C. § 472a(c).
IMPACT: In the instant case, both Plaintiff and Government
recently filed motions for summary judgment. However, the
administrative remedies had not been exhausted. Thus, the instant
case serves as a case study in how not following proper procedure
can delay the decision of an important case.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIRST CIRCUIT
Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2009).
LAW: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) holds that the Attorney General shall
take into custody any alien who
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed
any offense covered in section 11 82(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any
offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii),
(B), (C), or (D) of this title, (C) is deportable
under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis
of an offense for which the alien has been sentence to
a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or (D) is
inadmissible under section 11 82(a)(3)(B) of this title
or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
when the alien is released, without regard to whether
360 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or
probation, and without regard to whether the alien
may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same
offense.
FACTS: Houng Saysana is a native and citizen of Laos, who
entered the United States as a refugee in 1980. In 1990, he was
convicted of indecent assault and battery in Massachusetts state
court. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. In 2005,
Saysana was again arrested, this time for a failure to register as a sex
offender as required by Massachusetts state law because of the 1990
offense. The charge was later dismissed. In 2007, Saysana was
taken into custody by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and held without bond. On the same
day, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal
proceedings, contending that Saysana's 1990 conviction qualified as
an aggravated felony crime of violence and rendered him removable.
After agency proceedings in which bond was again denied, Saysana
filed this petition for habeas corpus in the district court, challenging
the conclusion of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that he is
subject to the mandatory detention provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
The District Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that
the BIA had misinterpreted the statute, and it granted the writ. The
Government timely appealed.
ANALYSIS: At the heart of this appeal is an interpretation of the
mandatory detention provision set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which
"is part of a provision that addresses the apprehension and detention
of aliens." More specifically, the court was to decide whether the
mandatory detention provision applies strictly in situations where an
alien "is released from a criminal custody the basis for which is one
of the offenses listed in section 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D); or alternatively,
whether it applies whenever an alien, previously convicted of an
offense that falls within § (c)(1)(A)-(D), is released from any
criminal custody regardless of the reason for that detention." The
issue centers on the "when released" language in section 1226(c).
The court utilized the reasoning in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat'1
Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Chevron requires
that the court focus on the statutory language. A natural reading of
the statutory provision from top to bottom "makes clear that the
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congressional requirement of mandatory detention is addressed to the
situation of an alien who is released from custody for one of the
enumerated offenses."
However, the Government submits that "when released" is
susceptible to another interpretation. More specifically, the
Government maintains that the 'released' language "must embrace a
broader meaning than a release from custody for an enumerated
offense because the statute requires mandatory detention for
individuals who are removable or inadmissible based on the
commission of certain offenses, whether or not they were convicted
of those offenses." See § 1226(c)(1)(A) & (D) (referring to other
portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) not requiring
a conviction). In other words, the Government concludes that
because § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D) includes offenses for which aliens
"might not be incarcerated, 'when released' must have a broader
meaning than the offenses in the statute."
But, the Government's effort to make § 1226(c)(1) "ambiguous"
is strained. Thus, the Court reasoned that in reading the provision as
a whole, it is clear that the "when released" language, relates to the
listed offenses in subsection (c)(1)(A)-(D). Overall, the Court found
that the text of the statute was clear. As a result, because the "when
released" language is not ambiguous, then "there is nothing for the
agency to interpret - no gap to fill - and there is no justification for
resorting to agency interpretation to address an ambiguity."
Therefore, the mandatory detention position "does not reflect a
general policy in favor of detention; instead, it outlines specific,
serious, circumstances under which the ordinary procedures for
release on bond at the discretion of the immigration judge should not
apply."
HOLDING: The court held that the mandatory detention
provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility act (IIRIRA) "applied only when the alien was
released from criminal custody for one of the qualifying offenses."
The judgment of the district court was affirmed, as the Court
concluded that the Government adopted an interpretation contrary to
the plain meaning of the statute. The Court also held, in the
alternative, that even if the statute were ambiguous, the interpretation
of the Government was not reasonable.
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IMPACT: The Court maintained that the meaning of the statute
was clear - the statute contemplates mandatory detention following
release from non-DHS custody for an offense specified in the statute,
not merely any release from any non-DHS custody. The Court stood
by the meaning of the law and was not swayed by attempts to
interpret the law in favor of the Government. By adhering to the
spirit and letter of the law, the court took steps in protecting the rights
of immigrants all across the United States.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2010).
LAW: 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) holds that an applicant may
qualify as a refugee
on the basis of past persecution if the applicant can
establish that he or she has suffered persecution in the
past in the applicant's country of nationality or, if
stateless, in his or her country of last habitual
residence, on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, and is unable or unwilling to return to, or
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country owing to such persecution. An applicant who
has been found to have established such past
persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-
founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original
claim. That presumption may be rebutted if an asylum
officer or immigration judge makes one of the
findings described in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this
section. If the applicant's fear of future persecution is
unrelated to the past persecution, the applicant bears
the burden of establishing that the fear is well-
founded.
FACTS: Temesgen Woldu Haile (Petitioner) was born in 1976
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Petitioner's parents were of Eritrean
origin, but at the time, Eritrea was a part of Ethiopia, thus both
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Petitioner and his parents were Ethiopian citizens. Petitioner's
parents had moved to Enitrea in 1992. In 1993, Eritrea separated
from Ethiopia. After Eritrea became independent, Petitioner's
parents acquired Eritrean citizenship and also renounced their
Ethiopian citizenship. Petitioner was a minor at the time and stayed
behind. Later, in 1998, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war.
Consequently, "Ethiopia indiscriminately rounded up and expelled
some 75,000 Ethiopian citizens [of Eritrean ethnicity]." Petitioner
fled Ethiopia "before he could be expelled, and eventually wound up
in the United States and sought asylum, contending that he'd been
stripped of his Ethiopian citizenship and that this was persecution."
However, the immigration judge denied Petitioner asylum "on the
ground that since a country has a right to determine who is a citizen,
taking away a person's citizenship is not, without more, persecution."
The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) then affirmed the
immigration judge's decision without discussing when or if
denationalization amounts to persecution.
ANALYSIS: Petitioner has now turned to the United States
Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, for relief. A panel of this Court
referred to the immigration judge's reasoning as problematic, and
then vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case back to the
Board. The Court instructed the Board to "consider the relation of
denationalization to persecution, and having done so to determine
whether the petitioner was still an Ethiopian citizen, which the
immigration judge had not bothered to determine since he thought it
irrelevant." However, on remand, the Board again denied the
application for asylum. The Board based their denial on the
observation that not all denationalizations constitute instances of
persecution. The Court agreed with this conclusion; in the instant
case, Petitioner is stateless - "there is no contention that his Eritrean
ethnicity makes him an Eritrean citizen." Simply put, the Board
prematurely leapt to the conclusion "that even if a person loses his
citizenship because of a 'protected ground' - which is to say a ground
on which U.S. law permits a person to seek asylum, such as religion
[or nationality]-such a loss of citizenship does not, without more,
amount to persecution." The Board's conclusion that Petitioner had
to prove "denationalization plus" does not "follow from its premise,
and unlike a jury an administrative agency, has to provide a reasoned
justification for its rulings." "From the correct premise that change
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of citizenship incident to a change in national boundaries is not
persecution per se, it does not follow that taking away a person's
citizenship because of his religion or ethnicity is not persecution." If
Ethiopia did denationalize Petitioner because of his Eritrean
ethnicity, "it did so because of hostility to Eritreans . . . and it is
enough to suggest that his denationalization was persecution and
created a presumption that he has a well-founded fear of being
persecuted should he be returned to Ethiopia." 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1).
Additionally, in 2003, Ethiopia passed a new law "allowing
persons who had lost their Ethiopian nationality because of their
acquisition of a foreign nationality to regain it by returning to live in
Ethiopia, renouncing their foreign citizenship, and applying for
readmission to Ethiopian citizenship." However, the record does not
indicate if readmission is automatic upon application, as persons who
never acquired foreign citizenship cannot actually renounce it.
Further, "[i]t's not as if the law simply reinstated the Ethiopian
citizenship of all persons who had lost it because of their Eritrean
ethnicity; the Board would then have had a stronger ground for
denying asylum to the petitioner." Petitioner would then have been
forced to show either that he faced persecution as a returning citizen
or that the mistreatment of Eritreans during the war "had been so
outrageous (like the Nazi treatment of the Jews) that a compelled
return to Ethiopia even with citizenship restored and apologies from
one's former persecutors would be a cruelty warranting what is
termed 'humanitarian' asylum." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii).
Technically, the law by its specific terms is only applicable to "a
person who was an Ethiopian national and has acquired foreign
nationality." However, Petitioner is stateless, as he has not acquired
foreign nationality. It is possible that despite its language, the
readmission law is applicable to Petitioner, but there is no actual
discussion of the issue by the Board.
HOLDING: The petition for review was granted. The matter
was remanded to the Board in order to determine whether the
Ethiopian government's act of stripping Petitioner of his Ethiopian
citizenship amounted to persecution.
IMPACT: The instant case is difficult to decide because of the
state of flux of Ethiopia as a nation. This problem is not unique, as
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several immigrants may also be "stateless" such as those from
Palestine. The Court's rationale to remand this case back to the
Board is a wise one, as the decision that follows will impact the life
of not only the Petitioner, but millions of refugees who have sought
protection in the United States from war-torn countries and whom are
not "stateless."
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 658 F. Supp. 2d 113
(D.D.C. 2009).
LAW: The Medicare Act, Title XVIII of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq., "creates a federally funded health insurance
program for the elderly and disabled." The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services ("CMS") "is the component of the Department of
Health and Human Services that administers the Medicare program
for the Secretary." Part A of the Medicare Act "reimburses hospitals
for the operating costs of certain inpatient services." See 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww. However, "in order to obtain this reimbursement eligible
hospitals file cost reports with their 'fiscal intermediaries,' allocating
a portion of those costs to Medicare." See 42 C.F.R. § 413.20.
Afterwards, the intermediaries "determine the amount owed by the
Secretary to the hospitals for the fiscal year at issue." See 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.1803(a). Hospitals may "appeal the payment determination to
the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (Board) within 180
days." See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a). The Board "may reverse, affirm
or modify the intermediary's decision; similarly, the Secretary
subsequently may reverse, affirm or modify the Board's decision."
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395oo(d) and (f)(1). Hospitals that are "still
dissatisfied with the final decision may seek judicial review by filing
suit in the appropriate United States district court." See 42 U.S.C. §
1395oo(f). Provider hospitals "receive reimbursement for the
'reasonable cost' of Medicare services provided." 42 U.S.C. §
1395x(v)(1)(A). The Secretary of Health and Human Services
"promulgated regulations outlining principles for reasonable cost
reimbursement." See 42 C.F.R., Part 413. The Secretary also created
a manual, referred to as the Provider Reimbursement Manual (PRM),
"to provide further detail to fiscal intermediaries to determine
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appropriate reimbursement." Premiums "hospitals pay for
malpractice insurance allocable to Medicare costs generally are
reimbursable." See PRM § 2162.2.A. The PRM generally disallows
from reimbursement, "however, insurance liability premiums paid to
captive insurers (those that are wholly-owned by the provider
hospitals) that are domiciled offshore and invest more than ten
percent of their assets in equity securities." See PRM § 2162.2.A.4.
FACTS: Catholic Health Initiatives (Plaintiffs), a non-profit
health care organization based in Denver, Colorado, brought this
action seeking judicial review of the Secretary of Health and Human
Service's denial of reimbursement under the Medicare statute for
certain insurance premium payments made by Plaintiffs. The
Plaintiffs are fifty-five Medicare participating hospitals. Plaintiffs
paid premiums to First Initiatives Insurance Ltd. (FIIL) for
malpractice, other liability, and workers' compensation coverage for
the Medicare cost reporting periods from 1997 on through 2002.
FIIL is a captive insurer, wholly-owned by Plaintiffs, and domiciled
in the Cayman Islands. FIIL invests forty to fifty percent of its assets
in equity securities. Based on the Medicare Provider Reimbursement
Manual (PRM) § 2161.2.A.4, "[P]laintiffs self-disallowed the
premiums they paid to FIIL on their Medicare cost reports."
Plaintiffs then requested a hearing challenging the self-disallowance
of these insurance premiums, which the Board conducted on
November 4, 2004. On January 24, 2007, the Board then issued a
decision upholding the disallowance of the insurance premiums paid
to FIIL. Then on March 9, 2007, CMS Administrator declined to
review the Board decision, essentially upholding it. Plaintiffs filed
suit in this Court on March 20, 2007. The question before this court
"is whether the Board's ruling - which found the reimbursement
standard expressed in the PRM to be consistent with both the
Medicare statute and the Medicare regulations - was lawful."
ANALYSIS: The instant matter came before this Court after the
parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' first
argument calls into question the Secretary's interpretation of the
Medicare statute and regulations. Specifically, Plaintiffs "contend
that the Board's denial of reimbursement for insurance premiums
paid to offshore captive insurers that invest more than ten percent of
their assets in equity securities is inconsistent with the plain meaning
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and intent of the Medicare statute to reimburse providers for their
'reasonable costs.'" When the action being reviewed "involves an
agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with
administering, the court applies the familiar analytical framework set
forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'1 Res. Def Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984)." Under Chevron, the court must consider whether
the Secretary's decision not to reimburse the costs at issue conflicts
with the plain language of the statute. Because the Medicare statute,
by its terms, does not say whether insurance premiums paid to
captive insurers that are domiciled offshore and invest more than ten
percent of their assets in equity securities are reimbursable, the court
will move to Chevron step two, to consider whether the agency's
interpretation was permissible. In step two, the Court concluded that
the Board's decision, which was adopted by the Secretary, "was
within the Secretary's broad discretion under the statute to exclude
reimbursement for costs 'found to be unnecessary in the efficient
delivery of needed health services."' 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A).
The Board found that the policy manual's investment restrictions
relating to offshore captive insurance companies "were not an
inappropriate or unreasonable development of the reasonable costs
principle." Further, the Board also noted that the Plaintiffs "did not
provide evidence that would have led it to conclude that the
investment restrictions were 'inappropriate or unreasonable."' The
Court noted that there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the findings of the Board, and that the Board reasonably
relied on these findings in support of its own interpretation of the
statute.
Plaintiffs also argue "that the Secretary's disallowance of
insurance premiums paid to captive insurers that are domiciled
offshore and invest more than ten percent of their assets in equity
securities conflicts with the Medicare statute's implementing
regulations." The Court did not use the Chevron test, but rather,
decided that the agency's interpretation "must be given controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation." Abington Crest Nursing & Rehab Ctr. v. Sebelius, 575
F.3d 717, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The Medicare statute "expressly
gives the Secretary the authority to issue regulations establishing the
methods to be used and the items to be included in determining
'reasonable costs' that will be reimbursed," 42 U.S.C. section
1395(v)(1)(A), and it also established that the Secretary has broad
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discretion in doing so. See Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514
U.S. 87, 95-96 (1995). Reasonable cost "includes all necessary and
proper costs incurred in fumishing the services, subject to principles
relating to specific items of revenue and cost." 42 C.F.R. § 413.9.
The regulation enumerates 'necessary and proper costs' as "costs that
are appropriate and helpful in developing and maintaining the
operation of patient care facilities and activities." 42 C.F.R. §
413.9(b)(2). The Board found that the premiums paid to the offshore
captive insurers at issue "were not 'proper' because offshore captives
are not 'subject to the same level of industry regulations applied to
onshore agencies by State insurance commissions."' Additionally,
the Board found that the denial of reimbursement for this type of
insurance premium "was consistent with the statute and with the
regulations, there could be no question that it would deny
reimbursement to these Plaintiffs. Further, the Board also found that
that FIIL was an "offshore captive insurance company, wholly-
owned by plaintiffs, and that it invested forty to fifty percent of its
assets in diversified equity securities." Given these facts, the Board
decided to disallow the costs.
Third, Plaintiffs argue that even if the Secretary's disallowance of
the hospital's premium costs is upheld, "the Secretary should
reimburse the actual liability claims paid during the years at issue."
The Court agreed with the Board in finding that the Plaintiffs were
"attempting an end run around the disallowed premium costs, and
that the plaintiffs [were] not entitled to relief on these grounds."
Further the Court noted that "nothing in the Medicare statute or
regulations, entitles insurers to reimbursement for paid claims;
instead, hospitals are expected to have valid insurance and are
reimbursed for premiums they have paid." In sum, hospitals that
select insurers whose liability premiums are not reimbursable "are
not entitled to have their insurers receive reimbursement for the
liability claims actually paid."
HOLDING: The Court granted Sebelius' motion for summary
judgment and denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
IMPACT: In the instant case, the Plaintiffs basically employed
questionable tactics, yet still tried to find a way to profit of off their
practices. Fortunately, the Board and Court were quick to point out
the misdeeds of the Plaintiffs. As a result, the Board and Court were
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able to prevent millions of dollars from being usurped by the
Plaintiffs.
Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dept. of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d
105 (D.D.C. 2009).
LAW: Executive Order 13,337 delegates to the State Department
Presidential authority to issue permits for the construction of an oil
pipeline across the United States border if it finds that the issuance of
the permit to the applicant "would serve the national interest." Exec.
Order No. 13,337, § 1(g), 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299 (Apr. 30, 2004).
Nevertheless, before issuing the permit, the State Department must
consult with various departments and agencies specified in the
Order. Id. at § 1(b)(ii). But, if any of the departments or agencies
disagrees with the proposed decision of the State Department, the
State Department must refer the permit application to the President
'for consideration and a final decision. Id. at § 1(i). Otherwise, the
State Department makes the final decision.
FACTS: The Natural Resources Defense Council and certain
local affiliates (collectively NRDC) brought this action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States Department
of State, along with various officers acting in their official capacity
(collectively, State Department) "on the ground that the State
Department violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f, by issuing a presidential 'permit'
to defendant-intervenor TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP
(Keystone) for a cross-border oil pipeline between the Canada and
the United States, which was based on an inadequate assessment of
environmental impacts." The term "permit" as used here "is the
written imprimatur of the President issued through the State
Department authorizing the applicant to proceed with the cross-
border project." NEPA mandates that "'all agencies of the Federal
Government shall ... include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement'
on environmental impacts." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Specifically,
the NRDC claims that the State Department's final Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) "did not comply with NEPA and its
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implementing regulations for numerous reasons, the details of which
are not relevant now." Thus, the NRDC now seeks a declaration that
the failure of the State Department to prepare an adequate EIS
violated NEPA and that the decision of the State Department to issue
the presidential permit based on that inadequate EIS violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Additionally, the NRDC also
seeks an injunction:
directing the State Department to revoke the permit
and to require that Keystone remove the portion of the
pipeline subject to the permit and that it cease any
further construction or activity until the State
Department complies with NEPA and the APA.
On the other hand, the State Department and Keystone
(collectively, Defendants) move to dismiss the NRDC's Amended
Complaint "on the ground that no legal basis exists to challenge State
Department decisions on behalf of the President to issue presidential
permits under Executive Order 13,337." Defendants maintain that
the NRDC "cannot point to any statutory authority that creates a
cause of action by which this Court may review the State
Department's conduct in this case." Defendants further contend that
"a private right of action is expressly foreclosed by the Executive
Order itself." See Exec. Order No. 13,337, § 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at
25,299.
ANALYSIS: The NRDC claimed a violation of both NEPA and
the APA. Both violations raise a federal question covered by 28
U.S.C. § 1331. The crux of the Defendants' arguments is "not
whether the NRDC has presented federal claims, but whether those
claims are enforceable against the State Department when it is acting
on behalf of the President pursuant to Executive Order 13,337." The
NRDC specifically claims that "agency action is not presidential
action unless there is some requirement that the President review the
agency action before it takes legal effect." However, an act need not
be personally carried out by the President in order to "constitute
presidential action exempt from judicial review under the APA." In
other words, the State Department stands in the shoes of the President
by "exercising the President's inherent discretionary power under the
Constitution to issue cross-border permits." Thus, in order to
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challenge an issuance of a presidential permit, whether it issued by
the President or by the State Department, "is to challenge a
presidential act, which is not reviewable under the APA. See Tulare
County v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d 18, 29 (D.D.C. 2001). In the instant
case, the President delegated his constitutional authority to a
subordinate agency. The President "has complete, unfettered
discretion over the permitting process." Further, there is no existing
statute that governs or curtails the President's discretion to issue
presidential permits, regardless if it is issued by the President, the
State Department, or any other department. As a result, the decision
to issue a permit whether it was made by the President himself, or the
State Department, is a presidential action - one not reviewable for
abuse of discretion.
HOLDING: The Court agrees with the Defendants and granted
their respective motions to dismiss.
IMPACT: If the Court had accepted the NRDC's position, the
Court would have frustrated the President's ability to enact his
preferred decision-making process. In essence, the decision of the
Court preserved the Congressional power of the President of the
United States to issue permits, whether issued by the President
himself, or issued by the State Department or other any other
department.
Morgan v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 657 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C.
2009).
LAW: The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) states in pertinent
part that, any employer who violates the provisions of either section
206 or section 207 "shall be liable to the employee or employees
affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
FACTS: Plaintiff Greg Morton, appearing pro se, is a former
employee of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), one of the
agencies housed within the Department of Transportation (DOT).
The FAA terminated Plaintiffs employment as an air traffic control
Legal Summaries 371Spring 2010
372 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
specialist on September 30, 2005. Plaintiff has brought suit against
the FAA and Susan Marmet, a former coworker. Plaintiff seeks
compensation under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., "for the
forty-five minutes he spent obtaining information for his medical
clearance on February 16, 2005." Plaintiffs second claim under the
FLSA "alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for bringing or
threatening to bring an FLSA action." Lastly, Plaintiff "challenges
his termination under the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12900 et seq., claiming that Marmet
violated the FEHA by 'discharging and/or discriminating [against]
and or harass[ing]' the [P]laintiff." Plaintiffs third action, alleging
similar FLSA claims and involving fifty-two other air traffic control
specialists, was brought in the Court of Federal Claims on October 1,
2007. See Whalen v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 685 (Fed. Cl. 2008).
On March 12, 2008, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed Plaintiff
from the case because of the pendency of the instant action.
Defendants filed the instant motion on February 9, 2009, which
sought to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint on the grounds of res
judicata, "but because those defenses were not included in the
defendants' original answer, the [D]efendants amended their answer
to include them." Harris v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126
F.3d 339, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Defendants have moved to dismiss, or for summary judgment, on
the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Because
Defendants filed this motion post-answer, the Court treats it as one
for summary judgment, as opposed to a motion to dismiss.
ANALYSIS: Defendants maintain "that the Federal Court
decision and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) decision
from which it was appealed, preclude the instant suit because in the
Federal Court action," the Plaintiff litigated the same claims, issues,
and facts the he currently seeks to litigate in this Court. Defendants
contend that those decisions "preclude both the plaintiffs FLSA
claims and his FEHA claim." Additionally, Defendants contend
"that the MSPB decision bars the FEHA claim because [P]laintiff
could have, but did not, assert harassment by Marmet as a defense to
his termination." Finally, Defendants assert that the fact that Plaintiff
seeks relief under a different legal theory in the instant case "than he
did in the MSPB matter does not diminish the applicability of the
affirmative defense of res judicata in this case." Plaintiff responds to
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Defendants' motion with several different arguments, several of
which have already been rejected by the Court.
Next, Plaintiff contends that even if issue and claim preclusion
did apply here, Defendants should still not be permitted to assert
those defenses because "[D]efendants failed to raise them in the
Court of Federal Claims matter." Additionally, Plaintiff made five
assertions, which he maintains are material facts in dispute: (1) the
FAA and Marmet are not "the same" as the DOT; (2) the Federal
Circuit opinion does not preclude this action; (3) the Federal Circuit
cannot make factual findings; (4) the facts in this lawsuit are not the
same as those in the MSPB matter; and (5) Marmet was not acting in
the scope of her employment with respect to Plaintiffs FEHA claim.
However, the Court determined that the "facts" cited by Plaintiff,
were in reality, "legal arguments," thus, the Court was not required to
accept them as true when ruling upon Defendants' motion for
summary judgment. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477
F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Further, the Court determined that
Plaintiff s arguments lacked merit.
The decision to grant summary judgment "requires a
determination of whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to
whether prior judgment exists and precludes this action."
Plaintiffs prior claim was "actually litigated," as the
administrative judge made factual findings based upon documents
submitted by both Plaintiff and the DOT, after Plaintiff waived a
hearing before the MSPB. See Pupis v. U.S. Postal Service, 105
M.S.P.R. 1 (MSPB 2007). Additionally, issues that were critical in
determining this action were "actually and necessarily determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction" in the previous action. Id. at 273.
The MSPB entered a decision against Plaintiff, which the Federal
Circuit subsequently affirmed. Lastly, if the court were to apply the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, it would not be unfair to Plaintiff
because he had great incentive to have litigated these claims in the
MSPB when his employment was at stake. See King v. Dep't of
Veterans Affairs, 105 M.S.P.R. 21 (MSPB 2007). Thus, the three
elements of issue preclusion are satisfied. Additionally, despite the
plaintiffs claim to the contrary, issue preclusion is appropriate even
though the plaintiff seeks different relief in this action than in the
MSPB action. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234
(1998)
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Further, the doctrine of issue preclusion renders meritless
"[P]laintiff s argument that he should be allowed to litigate his FLSA
claim here because he could not have asserted this claim in the
MSPB action," as the MSPB had already decided the issues of fact
that were necessary to determine the outcome here. As a result,
despite the jurisdictional bar preventing Plaintiff from bringing his
FLSA claim in the MSPB action, the Court declined to allow Plaintiff
"to relitigate the facts necessary to decide his FLSA claims."
Next, the Court turned to Plaintiffs FEHA claim. The instant
action, as well as the MSPB action, "arose from a common 'nucleus
of facts, i.e., the plaintiffs termination from his employment."'
Additionally, Plaintiff could have "raised retaliation and harassment
as defenses to his termination in his MSPB action." Further, Plaintiff
failed to challenge Defendants' assertion "that he pursued an
identical action through the MSPB." As a result, the Court held that
claim preclusion bars Plaintiffs FEHA claim.
Last, Plaintiff requested leave to file an amended complaint.
Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint would have supplemented
the allegations in the original complaint and would have substituted
the Administrator of the FAA for Marmet. Defendants opposed the
motion, "asserting that amendment would be futile." The Court
found that although the proposed amended complaint would add to
and alter the original complaint, it would not substantively alter the
allegations in the complaint. In other words, the proposed amended
complaint "would be subject to dismissal for the same reasons the
Court has concluded the original complaint is properly dismissed."
Thus, the Court held that the amended complaint would be futile. As
such, Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint was denied.
HOLDING: Since there was no genuine issue of material fact as
to whether res judicata barred this action, the Court concluded that
Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs
FLSA claims were barred by collateral estoppel, while the FEHA
claims were barred by claim preclusion.
IMPACT: Res judicata serves to prevent the waste of court time
and resources and to prevent frivolous law suits. In the instant case,
the Plaintiff was prevented from arguing his case in front of the
District Court for the District of Columbia when the Honorable
Ricardo M. Urbina found that Plaintiffs FLSA claims were barred
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by collateral estoppel, and the FEHA claims were barred by claim
preclusion. Judge Urbina's decision served to save the resources of
the judicial system for those cases that actually involve genuine
issues of material fact.
Peavey v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D.D.C. 2009).
LAW: 38 U.S.C. § 5 11(a) limits judicial review of decisions
made by the Veterans Affairs Secretary. The statute states that "[t]he
Secretary shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a
decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of
benefits by the Secretary to veterans or the dependents or survivors
of veterans." Further, "the decision of the Secretary as to any such
question shall be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by
any other official or by any court, whether by an action in the nature
of mandamus or otherwise."
FACTS: Pro se plaintiff Morris J. Peavey, Jr. (Plaintiff) is an
African-American, Orthodox Muslim Army veteran. Plaintiff has
brought the instant claim against the "United States Attorney
General, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Archivist of the
United States, the Director of the National Personnel Records Center
(NPRC), the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of the
Army in their official capacities, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), and the United States Postal Service (USPS)"
challenging numerous decisions of the Department of Veteran's
Affairs (VA) involving Plaintiffs potential entitlement to benefits
after his 1967 discharge from the Army. Plaintiff has also sought to
compel the release of several records under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). 5 U.S.C. § 552. Plaintiff has challenged
several VA decisions which determined "his entitlement to certain
veteran's benefits at various times since his discharge." Plaintiff
specifically alleged that the "VA incorrectly detennined his disability
rating on several occasions and improperly discontinued his benefits
for a period of several months in 2001 and in May and June of 2003."
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment.
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ANALYSIS: First, Plaintiff has brought claims challenging
various benefits made by the VA since Plaintiffs 1967 discharge
from the Army. Plaintiff also challenged the constitutionality of 38
U.S.C. § 511, which limits judicial review of the VA's benefits
decisions. Defendants countered by alleging that Plaintiffs claims,
including those alleging that the acts of the VA violated his
constitutional rights, "should be dismissed under 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction" and that Plaintiffs facial challenge to
§511, "should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim." The Court found that Plaintiff failed in supporting his vague
argument that §511 is facially unconstitutional. As a result, the Court
dismissed Plaintiffs facial challenge to §511 for failure to state a
claim for relief. Additionally, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs
challenges to the VA's decisions on his benefit claims for lack of
jurisdiction.
Second, Plaintiff also brought FOIA claims against the Director
of the NPRC, as well as the VA Secretary, to compel release of
records requested. Plaintiff specifically alleged that VA, the VA
Hospital Center in Brooklyn, New York, as well as the NPRC, the
designated repository for Official Military Personnel Files, failed to
completely respond to his FOIA requests for documents. Plaintiff
contends that he requested copies of his own military records and
early VA medical records, but, that his requests were "consistently"
refused. Defendants have moved to dismiss the FOIA claims as
moot, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Defendants
allege that the agencies produced all the documents that they
possessed, in response to Plaintiffs requests. The Court found that
the NPRC took reasonable steps to respond to Plaintiffs FOIA
request, including a search of the relevant system of records that
could potentially contain the documents in question, including
Plaintiffs OMPF. Thus, Plaintiff failed to create a material dispute
regarding the adequacy of the NPRC's search efforts. As a result, the
Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants regarding
Plaintiff's FOIA claim seeking the release of records from the NPRC.
Plaintiff also filed a FOIA request with the VA seeking his
military records relating a car accident he was involved in, "findings
and impressions from an 'intravenous pyelogram,"' records from a
1968 hospitalization in a Brooklyn VA hospital, and documents
relating to his employment at a restaurant. Plaintiff contends that the
VA's response to his FOIA requests was insufficient, claiming that
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the VA "did not find and produce copies of certain medical testing
performed at an Army hospital in 1966, or any copies of clinical and
laboratory records or doctors' reports from his 1968 Brooklyn VA
hospital stay." In response, the VA "submitted undisputed evidence
that the VA regional office provided [Plaintiff] with a copy of his
entire claims and the VA hospital searched both its on-site and
archived records, producing records relating to [Plaintiff] it retrieved
from a Missouri storage facility." Despite Plaintiffs claims, the
Court cited "undisputed evidence that the VA regional office and
Brooklyn VA hospital conducted reasonable searches in response to
[Plaintiff's] FOIA requests and produced all responsive documents
located in their searches." Thus, the Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants.
Third, Plaintiff alleged that the NPRC, VA, and Army "acted
together to conceal, alter, or destroy government records in an
attempt to obstruct justice in violation of several criminal statutes,
including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1503, 1505, 1512, and 1519." The
Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claims under
18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1503, 1505, 1512, and 1519. Additionally,
Plaintiff alleged the actions of the NPRC, VA, and Army also
"violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights by interfering with
his ability to obtain benefits and correct his military records."
However, Plaintiff failed to provide facts "in support of his
conclusory allegation that, if proven, would entitle him to relief."
Because Plaintiff failed to allege facts, "that, if proven, demonstrate
that he did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his
benefits claims or record correction request, his due process claim
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim."
Fourth, Plaintiff sought damages for the numerous alleged
wrongs he has suffered since 1967. Plaintiff brought both
constitutional and common law tort claims. Since Plaintiffs claims
have been brought against federal agencies and officials in their
official capacities, the claims "must be construed as claims against
the United States." Further, Plaintiffs allegation that he will bring
"tort" claims suggests that he will bring his tort claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680. It is worth
noting that the "United States has waived its immunity from suit for
certain torts under the FTCA." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). But, the
FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity is not applicable to
constitutional tort claims. Additionally, before a plaintiff can even
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file suit under the FTCA, the claim must "'first [be] presented to...
the appropriate Federal agency."' 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Moreover,
the "exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory
prerequisite to filing such a lawsuit in federal court." In the instant
case, Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence to show that "he
properly exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to any
potential FTCA claim against any of the defendant agencies." As a
result, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs tort claims for damages against
the United States.
Fifth, Plaintiff has brought claims under civil rights statutes, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 and 1985. However, the statutes do not apply to
actions against the United States. Because Plaintiff brings these
claims solely against the federal defendants in their official
capacities, "he has not stated claims under these civil rights statutes
and these claims will be dismissed."
Sixth, Plaintiff alleged that he will bring a Bivens suit against the
Defendants. A Bivens suit is brought against federal officers, serving
in their individual capacity and the "complaint must at least allege
that the defendant federal official was personally involved in the
illegal conduct." However, Plaintiff "neither sued nor served the
named defendants in the individual capacities, nor alleged any facts
suggesting that the agency heads named in the complaint ... were
personally involved in the alleged conduct underlying his claims."
Given the fact that the Plaintiff failed to state Bivens claims against
the named Defendants, the Court dismissed the Bivens claims with
prejudice.
Seventh, Plaintiff claimed harassment by the EEOC, IRS, and
USPS. However, Plaintiff "failed to allege any facts stating a
plausible claim that these agencies unlawfully infringed upon any of
his fundamental rights." Thus, the Court dismissed all claims against
these Defendants.
Eighth, Plaintiff alleged "that he was injured by the Department
of Justice's (DOJ) failure to investigate and bring charges based upon
a complaint he filed with the DOJ accusing the VA or its agents of
unlawfully concealing, altering, or destroying federal records." The
Court found "no colorable argument that Congress intended for
judicial review of the DOJ's decision not to investigate or bring
charges based upon [Plaintiffs] complaint against the VA." Thus,
the Court dismissed this claim.
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Ninth, Plaintiff sought judicial review of an Army Board for
Corrections of Military Records (ABCMR) decision that refused to
correct his army records. Plaintiff alleges that he had submitted a
claim to the ABCMR when he released from service, but that the
ABCMR "did not properly investigate his claim to correct his
military records and denied him relief. Specifically, Plaintiff sought
"an order directing the ABCMR to overturn a January 23, 1967 court
martial judgment and correct his records to reflect the rank he would
have obtained but for the judgment." The district court does have
jurisdiction to review an ABCMR decision, but the claim must be
brought within six years of the decision. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). As a
result, the Court dismissed the claim because Plaintiffs claim was
untimely on its face and barred by the statute of limitations.
HOLDING: The Court found no material factual dispute, and
decided that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on Plaintiffs FOIA claims. Also, the Court granted Defendant's
motion, "now treated as a motion for summary judgment - with
respect to the FOIA claims only." Last, because Plaintiff "failed to
state any other claim entitling him to relief over which the district
court has jurisdiction, the remainder of the complaint will be
dismissed."
IMPACT: Though Plaintiffs claims were numerous, the Court
effectively dissected the half-dozen or so arguments and correctly
ruled in favor of the Defendants. Plaintiff employed an "everything
but the kitchen sink" type argument, as he sued numerous
government entities, employers, and individuals under several
diverse claims. However, the Court's ability to sift through the maze
of arguments should be commended, as granting summary judgment
and dismissing the claims not only allowed Plaintiff to plead his case,
but also prevented court resources from being wasted by a Plaintiff
with weak arguments and little facts to back them up.
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COURT OF APPEALS
Odeniran v. Hanley Wood, LLC, 985 A.2d 421 (D.C. 2009).
LAW: Under District of Columbia law, "a person who is fired
from his job for 'gross misconduct' is not eligible to receive
unemployment compensation benefits until after the passage of a
substantial waiting period, during which he must earn a prescribed
level of wages with another employer." See 7 DCMR § 312.3.
FACTS: Henry Oderniran (Plaintiff) worked at Hanley Wood,
LLC, (Defendant) a real estate market research firm, from June 11,
2007, until March 17, 2008. Plaintiff joined Defendant after he was
told during an interview "that the company expected a consulting
position to 'open up' in the near future." Thus, Plaintiff took a pay
cut from the job that he held previously in order to join Defendant as
a Research Associate. Unfortunately, because of the economic
downturn, Defendant "disbanded its consulting business, so a
promotion to [a consulting position] was no longer an option" for
Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff also felt that his responsibilities as a
Research Associate increased several times without a corresponding
raise in pay. Moreover, Plaintiff was convinced that Defendant's
parking reimbursement procedures failed to adequately "take into
account the travel expenses that he incurred as part of his duties." In
an attempt to avoid the parking costs, Plaintiff asked permission to
work from home.
On Wednesday, March 12, 2008, according to the Regional
Manager (Manager) for Defendant, Plaintiff said that "'needed to
make more money and be able to work from home, or he would have
to find another job."' The Manager informed Plaintiff that a pay
raise was not likely because of the market conditions. Also, although
Defendant did allow some employees to work from home, the
Manager felt that Plaintiffs performance "did not merit the
telecommuting privilege." Two days later, on Friday, March 14,
2008, Plaintiff informed the Manager via e-mail that he was taking a
sick day. The Manager testified that he responded "responded right
away," informing Plaintiff of the two looming deadlines that Plaintiff
had that day. Per the Manager, Plaintiff never responded to his e-
mails, and Plaintiff missed both deadlines.
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On Monday March, 17, the Manager observed Plaintiff on the
Internet, not doing any kind of work related to Defendant, and not
making any work-related phone calls. Plaintiff claimed he was "busy
with other stuff," but did not provide any details. This caused the
Manager to believe that Plaintiff was lying. The Manager became
concerned about Plaintiff s apparent failure to perform his job-related
activities, so he contacted the Human Resources Director (Director).
The Director phoned Plaintiff to ask about his activities for the day
and Plaintiff informed the Director that he "preferred not to answer
[those] questions." Plaintiff was fired at the end of the day.
Defendant ultimately fired Plaintiff not for the ultimatum or missed
deadlines, but because of his failure to perform his duties on March
17.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) credited Defendant's
version of the facts, noting that Defendant's witnesses provided
"detailed and consistent testimony," regarding Plaintiff s termination;
whereas Plaintiff provided "vague and incomplete responses to that
testimony." Ultimately, the ALJ found that Plaintiff "was fired for
gross misconduct, and thus was ineligible to receive unemployment
compensation benefits at the time of his termination."
ANALYSIS: The issue on appeal is whether 7 DCMR § 312.3
applies to Plaintiff. Gross misconduct has been defined "as an act
'which deliberately or willfully violates the employer's rules,
deliberately or willfully threatens or violates the employer's interests,
shows a repeated disregard for the employee's obligation to the
employer, or disregards standards of behavior which an employer has
a right to expect of its employee."' 7 DCMR § 312.3. On the other
hand, simple misconduct includes the "acts where the severity,
degree, or other mitigating circumstances do not support a finding of
gross misconduct." 7 DCMR § 312.5. Simple misconduct also refers
to 'an act or omission by an employee which constitutes a breach of
the employee's duties or obligations to the employer, a breach of the
employment agreement or contract, or which adversely affects a
material employer interest."' Id.
The Court in the instant case accepted the AU's factual findings
that on the day of his termination, Plaintiff was not performing his
assigned work. However the Court found that the "'ALJ committed
legal error in holding that these facts establish that [Plaintiff] engaged
in 'gross misconduct."' Though the Court noted that Plaintiff did fail
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to carry out his work-related duties, his actions did "not constitute
gross misconduct within the meaning of the unemployment benefits
statute." Moreover, Defendant, which bore the burden of proof,
failed to "present evidence that [Plaintiffs] willful non-performance
on March 17th was other than an isolated incident." Nor did
Defendant "contend that its business had suffered serious
consequences as a result."
Though Plaintiffs acts did not constitute gross misconduct, "the
record does make clear," that Plaintiff was terminated for simple
misconduct. Simple misconduct describes "'an act or omission by an
employee which constitutes a breach of the employee's duties or
obligations to the employer ... or which adversely affects a material
employer interest."' 7 DCMR § 312.5. Moreover, 7 DCMR §
312.6 "explicitly states that '[c]onducting unauthorized personal
activities during business hours' may constitute simple misconduct.
These regulations fit like a glove [Plaintiffs] conscious decision to
spend the day on the Internet instead of doing his job despite being
chided more than once.'
HOLDING: In the instant case, "[t]he AU erred as a matter of
law in concluding that [Plaintiff] was fired for gross misconduct."
However, Plaintiffs intentional refusal to do his work on the day of
his termination did constitute simple misconduct. The Court
remanded the instant case to OAH "for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion."
IMPACT: The Court examined the facts in the record and
correctly reversed the decision of the lower court. Though Plaintiff
did not carry out his work-related obligations, his actions hardly
constituted "gross misconduct." This Court reassessed the available
information and correctly decided that while Plaintiffs actions were
not admirable, they constituted simple misconduct, and not gross
misconduct. As a result, Plaintiff is entitled to the compensation
benefits he rightfully deserved.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF MINNESOTA
Minneapolis P.D. v. Kelly, 776 N.W.2d 760 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
LAW: The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that,
rather than arresting and detaining a misdemeanor
offender, officers are to give citations unless: it
reasonably appears to the officer that arrest or
detention is necessary to prevent bodily harm to the
accused or another or further criminal conduct, or that
there is a substantial likelihood that the accused will
fail to respond to a citation. The citation may be
issued in lieu of an arrest, or if an arrest has been
made, in lieu of continued detention. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 6.01, subd. l(1)(a) (2008).
FACTS: At about noon on January 8, 2004, Phillip Kelly
(Respondent), "a middle-aged, African-American resident of
Minneapolis, was walking to a convenience store to purchase bread
and cigarettes." A Minneapolis park police officer was driving in the
area at the same time and "heard a dispatch reporting an armed
robbery at a nearby business." The suspect involved in the robbery
"was described as an African-American male wearing a black jacket
and jeans." Respondent was similarly dressed, as he "was wearing
blue jeans, and his jacket and hood were black." The park officer,
suspecting that Respondent could potentially be the reported robber,
"radioed for backup, approached [Respondent] from behind, and told
him to stop." Respondent did not see or hear the officer because he
had headphones on, as he was listening to a music device, so he did
not hear the command to stop. The park officer then "grabbed
[Respondent] from behind, placed a handcuff on one of his wrists,
and wrestled him to the ground." Respondent resisted because he
was startled and did not know why he had been taken down.
Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers Villamor and Dubay
then arrived to assist the arresting park officer. Because Respondent
did not know why he was seized, he "continued to resist being
handcuffed and refused to enter the squad car." Officer Villamor
then applied pain-compliance holds and knee strikes in order to force
Respondent into the squad car. The officers involved "testified that
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[Respondent] appealed to bystanders for help in what he perceived to
be a baseless, racist seizure." Once in the squad car, Respondent still
"remained angry and the officers testified that they could not
communicate with him." After he was subdued, the MPD officers
then took Respondent into the store that was robbed. The MPD
officers then arranged for the store employees to actually view
Respondent. The store employees informed the officers that
Respondent was not the robber. Though Respondent asked to be
released, the officers "informed [Respondent] that he was under
arrest for his pre-show-up conduct and brought him to the Hennepin
County jail, charging him with the misdemeanors of disorderly
conduct, Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 385.90 (2004),
and obstruction of legal process, Minn. Stat. § 609.50 (2004)." The
record contains a form that the officers completed, that had boxes
checked off "indicating that [Respondent] was detained because of
the risk that he would commit further crimes and would not respond
to a citation." Respondent was officially "jailed at 1:23 p.m. and
released from jail at about 6:30 p.m." In the end, the charges against
Respondent were dropped.
Based on this series of events, Respondent filed a complaint
against the MPD with the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights.
Respondent "claimed he was assaulted and wrongfully jailed, and
that race wrongfully played a role in those actions. An investigator
concluded that there was probable cause that racial discrimination
had occurred and referred the complaint to the [Minneapolis
Commission on Civil Rights (Commission)]." The Commission had
a panel of three members consider the matter. See Minneapolis,
Minn., Code of Ordinances § 141.50(i) (2008) (Ordinance). The
hearing "followed a jury-trial format with two commissioners acting
as jurors and the third commissioner as the presiding officer." Based
on the hearing, the panel "concluded: (1) the officers did not use
excessive force when they apprehended [Respondent] and took him
to the show-up; (2) the MPD unreasonably detained [Respondent]
after he was cleared of the robbery; and (3) 'race was a discernible,
discriminatory and causative factor in [Respondent] adverse
treatment."' The panel "awarded Kelly $5,000 for mental suffering,
$382.50 in actual damages, and $8,500 in punitive damages, and
ordered payment of an additional $8,500 in civil penalties to the City
of Minneapolis." MPD, by writ of certiorari, "seeks reversal of the
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decision by the Commission that MPD officers unfairly discriminated
against [R]espondent."
ANALYSIS: The Court broke the instant case down into two
separate issues. The first issue asks the question of "whether the
record adequately supports the discrimination decision by the
commission." The Court used the test laid out in City of Minneapolis
v. Richardson, 239 N.W. 2d 197, 201-02 (Minn. 1976), which
required that the claimant "introduce evidence showing that (1) the
claimant is a member of a protected class; (2) the claimant was
subjected to adverse and unreasonable treatment; and (3) the
treatment was caused by a discriminatory consideration of race."
Richardson holds that the third element of the prima facie -
discrimination - "may be established by either direct or indirect
evidence." Id. at 202. The Commission found that Respondent "is a
member of a protected class because of his race, was subjected to
adverse action by the MPD, and race was a discernable factor under
the so-at-variance test." In the instant case, the role of the Court was
"to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the
Commission's conclusion that the MPD's conduct was so at variance
with reasonable expectations that discrimination is the probable
explanation." The officers, citing Respondent's earlier behavior,
where he had been "angry and resistant," feared that Respondent
would fail to respond to a citation by appearing in court, so they
arrested him. However, "[tihe [C]ommission, based on its review of
the record and credibility of witnesses, determined that there was no
valid or legal reason to arrest and detain [Respondent]." Thus, the
Court found "that there was adequate indirect evidence in the record
to provide substantial evidence supporting the [C]ommission's
determination of racial discrimination in the continued arrest and
jailing of [Respondent] by the MPD."
The second issue is "whether the damages are supported by the
record?" The MPD has maintained "that even if the finding of racial
discrimination is warranted, the asserted damages were unsupported
by the evidence." On the other hand, Petitioner contends "that the
award should be greater." With respect to the $5,000 awarded to
Respondent for mental anguish, "the MPD argues that there is no
evidence of mental injury." In the instant case, Petitioner specifically
"described the emotional anguish caused by the MPD's alleged
discrimination," as "[h]e testified that he felt powerless and that he
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'had no rights."' Respondent's own testimony "established
humiliation and distress suffered incident to his wrongful arrest and
jailing." Because Respondent's testimony was sufficient to establish
mental anguish, the Court "conclude[d] that the [C]omission did not
abuse its discretion in awarding [Respondent] $5,000 for mental
anguish." The MPD has also challenged "the civil penalty payable to
the City of Minneapolis and punitive-damage award." Since these
two types of damages are "interrelated," the Court considered them
together. In the instant case, despite the MPD's contentions, "the
[C]ommission panel awarded punitive damages as a part of the
special-verdict award in response to jury instructions that set forth the
requisite statutory factors, finding that 'by clear and convincing
evidence' the MPD 'acted with deliberate disregard for the rights of
[Respondent]."' In regard to the civil penalties, "the [C]omission
concluded that the harm [inflicted by MPD] was intentional, serious,
and detrimental to the public." Overall, the Court found "that the
award of damages based on a finding of racial discrimination [was]
supported by substantial evidence and [was] not arbitrary and
capricious."
HOLDING: The Court affirmed "[C]ommission's finding that
MPD unfairly discriminated against Petitioner in the decision to
arrest and jail him for misdemeanor violations." The Court "also
affirm[ed] the [C]ommission's award for emotional and punitive
damages and the imposition of a civil penalty on realtor."
IMPACT: The decision of the Court in the instant case is
noteworthy because it acknowledges the harsh truth that racism and
racial profiling still exist in the 21st century. Even though
Respondent was a middle-aged man walking to the convenience store
in broad daylight to purchase bread and cigarettes, he was arrested
for being an African-American man that vaguely met the description
given to the MPD officers. The Court's decision is important
because it will serve as a reminder to law enforcement officials to
follow proper procedure when arresting suspects accused of
wrongdoing in order to avoid paying damages-whether they be
emotional, physical, punitive, or civil.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE
Anderson v. Me. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 985 A.2d 501 (Me.
2009).
LAW: Title 5 M.R.S. § 17921(1) (2008) states in relevant
part that
"disabled" means a member is mentally or physically
incapacitated under the following conditions: A. The
incapacity is expected to be permanent; B. That it is
impossible to perform the duties of the member's
employment position; C. After the incapacity has
continued for two years, the incapacity must render
the member unable to engage in any substantially
gainful activity for which the member is qualified by
training, education or experience; and D. The
incapacity may be revealed by examinations or tests
conducted in accordance with section 17926.
FACTS: Bethany C. Anderson (Plaintiff) was an art teacher in
the Caribou School District of Maine from 1991 until February 2006.
Beginning in approximately 1995, Plaintiff developed progressive
pain all over her body. Plaintiff suffered from pain and numbness in
her feet that would at times, cause her to fall. This pain was such that
it would often cause Plaintiff to not sleep and she was "constantly
fatigued." Plaintiff was frequently absent from her work because of
the pain. In 2005, Plaintiff began receiving treatment from her
primary-care physician, David Connor, M.D., because "her joint pain
caused her to leave work and go to the emergency room." It was
shortly after this that Plaintiff "filed an application for disability
retirement benefits, pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 17925. On February 9,
2006, after Plaintiff left work early to see Dr. Connor after her limbs
were too weak to perform her duties at school, "Dr. Connor noted
that in addition to her physical ailments, [Plaintiff] was emotionally
unstable, which he thought was primarily caused by stress from
work." Dr. Connor removed Plaintiff from her teaching position,
thinking that she was headed toward a psychological breakdown.
Later that month, "Dr. Connor diagnosed [Plaintiff] with chronic
fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, and Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease,
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the latter being the cause of [Plaintiffs] falls. Dr. Connor advised
that at this point, Plaintiff "could work for about twenty hours a week
with some modifications," which included not having to carry heavy
equipment between classrooms. Further, Dr. Connor prescribed
Plaintiff an anti-depressant and referred her to a neurosurgeon and
psychiatrist.
In March 2006, the executive director of Maine Public
Employees Retirement System (MPERS) received reports from six
medical consultants, each of whom "had been asked to review one of
the bases for [Plaintiffs] claim of disability." On April 10, 2006,
after examining the reports, the executive director denied Plaintiffs
application for disability benefits after determining that Plaintiffs
"degenerative cervical spine disease did not make it impossible for
her to do her job, and that there was no objective medical data to
prove that she had fibromyalgia, Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease, or
depression." Plaintiff then appealed the executive director's decision
to the MPERS Board of Trustees (Board), pursuant to 5 M.R.S. §
17451(1).
In September 2006, after reviewing all of the records and
information submitted by Plaintiff, the medical board found that the
diagnosis of fibromyalgia was warranted, "but also noted that it was
premature to determine whether those functional limitations would be
permanent." After a hearing on Plaintiff's appeal was held in
October 2006, both parties were allowed to submit additional
evidence and arguments. In February 2007, the MPERS hearing
officer "issued an opinion regarding [Plaintiffs] appeal, finding that
[Plaintiffs] impairments from her major depression, fibromyalgia,
and degenerative cervical spine disease did make it impossible for
her to perform the duties of her teaching position." However, the
hearing officer also decided "that the matter needed to be remanded
to the executive director to determine whether these impairments
were expected to be permanent." In May 2007, after reviewing the
evidence presented, "the medical board advised the executive
director that the functional limitations described by [Plaintiff] would
not likely be permanent." Later that month, on May 17, 2007,
MPERS concluded, partly based on the recommendation of the
medical board, that Plaintiffs "depression, fibromyalgia, and
degenerative cervical spine disease did not result in an incapacity that
was expected to be permanent." In response, Plaintiff "again
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requested leave to appeal to appeal and submit updated medical
information, which was granted."
Months later, "[i]n August 2007, the medical board again advised
the executive director that [Plaintiffs] impairments were not likely to
be permanent." The executive director of MPERS "upheld the May
17, 2007, decision denying benefits, a decision that was affirmed by
the Board on January 3, 2008." Plaintiff then appealed the decision
of the Board to the superior court. The superior court reviewed the
evidence in the record, as related to permanency, and found that
Plaintiff "met her burden of proof to the exclusion of any other
inferences." The superior court "vacated the decision of the Board
and remanded the matter to the Board for an award of disability
benefits to [Plaintiff]."
MPERS appealed the "judgment entered in the [s]uperior [c]ourt
which vacated a decision of the Board denying disability retirement
benefits to [Plaintiff]." MPERS argued "that although Anderson has
shown that her impairments make it impossible for her to carry out
her employment duties as an art teacher, she failed to prove that her
incapacity is expected to be permanent, and therefore the Board
properly denied her disability benefits, pursuant to 5 M.R.S. §
17921(1) (2008)."
ANALYSIS: Five days prior to the court issuing the order
denying MPERS' motion for reconsideration, the Court decided
Kelley v. Me. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 967 A.2d 676 (Me. 2009). In
Kelly, the Court decided that MPERS, when deciding disability
claims, "could consider reports from its medical board, as authorized
by statute, and that consideration of the information in such reports in
reaching decisions that did not amount to a due process violation or
violation of any rights confrontation or cross-examination." Id. at
684. Thus, "the trial court erred in holding that the Board should not
have considered the medical board reports in the Board's decision-
making process." In the instant case, "the report of the medical board
constitutes an evaluation questioning Plaintiffs evidence of
permanency." Given that this information can be considered part of
the record, "the record does not compel a conclusion contrary to the
findings of the Board that [Plaintiff] had failed to meet her burden of
proof to demonstrate that her incapacity was expected to be
permanent." However, "[e]ven if the medical board report is put
aside, the record includes other evidence that demonstrates that the
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Board was compelled to conclude that [Plaintiff] had met her burden
of proof." The record not only included "evidence that the Board
was not compelled to conclude that [Plaintiff] had met her burden of
proof," but also, Plaintiffs "medical evidence included indications
that she was making some improvement." Further, the record also
contained evidence that Plaintiff could engage, and was "engaging in,
activities that were inconsistent with a condition of permanent
disability." A short time after Plaintiff left the Caribou School
Department, she took up a three-year term on the Caribou Zoning
Board of Appeals. Further, though Plaintiff claimed to be
permanently disabled, she pursued a master's degree, won awards for
academic performance, completed recertification courses for her
teaching certificate, produced and sold art calendars for sale on the
Internet, and even wrote and published children's books.
HOLDING: After gathering facts and analyzing the medical
reports, "neither the superior court, nor this [C]ourt could conclude
that the Board was compelled to find that [Plaintiff's] incapacity was
expected to be permanent such that she was entitled to receive
permanent disability benefits." The Court vacated the judgment of
the superior court and remanded the matter to the superior court with
the direction to affirm the Board's decision.
IMPACT: Though Plaintiff alleged both physical pain and
depression, amongst a list of other ailments, the validity of her claim
for disability is tenuous. Resources for the impoverished, physically
impaired, and mentally ill are extremely limited. By taking the extra
step to examine the validity of Plaintiffs claims, and poring over her
medical records, the court is effectively ensuring that these limited
resources will be reserved for the truly impoverished, impaired, or ill,
and not those who illicitly attempt to tap into these funds.
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